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The Supreme Court’s 2013 Tax
Cases: Side-Stepping the Interesting,
Important and Difficult Issues
Neil Brooks and Kim Brooks*

I. JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
In last year’s Supreme Court Law Review we wrote a somewhat
lengthy introduction to the four tax cases the Court decided in 2012.1 We
contrasted the formalistic approach that the Court took in resolving those
cases with the more pragmatic and consequentialist approach we argued
it should have taken. We will not repeat our concern here, although the
three cases the Court decided in 2013 suffer as well from the Court’s
formalist approach to tax law. Instead, we will briefly introduce these
cases by lamenting another frequently noted characteristic of the Court’s
tax cases, namely, its penchant for deciding tax cases on narrow grounds
and its unwillingness to engage with the more interesting and important
questions presented by the cases in which it grants leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court hears only a small number of tax cases a year:
two, three or four. Given that its decision to consider a tax case
represents a commitment of scarce and valuable resources that might
have been devoted to cases that might be of more obvious importance to
broader Canadian society, one might have supposed that the Court would
choose tax cases in which the general expertise of the Court could
illuminate difficult but contested and pervasive principles of tax law. One
might have supposed that it would carefully select cases where it thinks it
could make a contribution and that its judgments would be written to
provide much needed guidance for the Canada Revenue Agency
(“CRA”) and lower courts in how to achieve a more equitable, efficient
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and practicable income tax. Although the Income Tax Act2 is an
incredibly detailed statute it is replete with gaps, conflicts, ambiguities
and vague provisions. Tax law in large part is composed of administrative rules and practices and judge-made law.
Yet, to the extent that the Court does grant leave to appeal in cases
that raise interesting, important and difficult tax issues, often the Court
then sidesteps these issues, as demonstrated in the three cases decided in
2013. It resolves the cases by reference to a narrow formalistic point that
settles the case but does nothing to advance our understanding of tax
principles or tax law. Indeed, the Court often appears intent on avoiding
at all costs the complexity of tax cases and tax policy making. This
approach to tax cases seems inconsistent with the Court’s general
institutional commitment to the quality of the legal system.
One of the important but unresolved issues in tax law is the tax
treatment of contingent liabilities assumed by the buyer in a sale of
business assets. The Act has no provision dealing with this issue and its
resolution involves reconciling a number of competing tax principles.
Numerous tax commentators have speculated on the correct tax treatment
of assumed contingent liabilities and over the year the CRA has taken
inconsistent positions.3 This was the issue raised in Daishowa-Marubeni
International Ltd. v. Canada.4 Both lower courts struggled with the issue.
However, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue entirely by holding
that the liability created in the case was not a contingent liability but a
future cost embedded in an asset. As we argue below, they were wrong to
re-characterize the transaction — it was clearly a contingent liability —
but further, as we also argue, the application of tax principles to assumed
contingent liabilities was the issue on which the Court could have made
an important contribution. Not only did the Court not contribute to the
resolution of the issue, but also in order to sidestep it the Court added a
new layer of complexity to the issue by injecting a novel concept of
“embedded” future costs into tax law.
The Act provides a detailed set of rules in section 87 that allow
qualifying corporations to amalgamate without tax consequences. A tax
issue that has puzzled the CRA and tax practitioners for years, and on
which the Act is silent, is how amalgamations are taxed if they do not
2

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).
Infra, note 12.
4
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meet the qualifying conditions of section 87. This issue arose in Envision
Credit Union v. Canada,5 which involved a corporate amalgamation and
an outrageous accompanying tax plan in which the taxpayer was
attempting to claim a tax deduction for the same expense twice. Both
lower courts dealt with the question of the taxation of amalgamations
that did not qualify for non-recognition treatment under section 87 and
both held that the taxpayer’s plan would fail under the appropriate tax
treatment of such amalgamations. The Supreme Court held that section
87 applied to the transaction and as a result the tax plan was
unsuccessful; consequently, it did not address the issue of the tax
treatment of non-qualifying amalgamations. The Court was likely correct
that section 87 applied to the taxpayer’s transaction but it based its
holding on metaphysical grounds instead of an analysis of the purpose of
section 87. Moreover, it is unfortunate it did not go on and say something
about the absurdity of the taxpayer’s position with respect to the tax
treatment of non-qualifying amalgamations.
There has been considerable uncertainty in lower level courts about
the applicability of the restitutionary remedy of rectification in tax cases.
Ambiguities have arisen around whether the remedy is available under
the civil law, whether the approach to the remedy in the tax law context
should mirror the approach taken in other substantive law areas
(particularly contract law), and whether there are consistent boundaries
to the application of the remedy that might be applied by lower level
courts and administrative decision makers. In Québec (Agence du
Revenu) v. Services Environnementaux AES inc.,6 the Supreme Court
resolved the issues of the availability of rectification in the civil law
context but sidestepped the resolution of the other issues that have
troubled tax planners, policy makers, and lower levels of court.

II. DAISHOWA-MARUBENI INTERNATIONAL LTD. V. CANADA: WHEN
IS A CONTINGENT LIABILITY NOT A CONTINGENT LIABILITY?
1. Interpreting the Statute versus Characterizing the Taxpayer’s
Transaction
One of the reasons interpreting income tax law is so intellectually
challenging is that for many tax issues the theoretically correct answer
5
6

[2013] S.C.J. No. 48, 2013 SCC 48, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 191 (S.C.C.).
[2013] S.C.J. No. 65, 2013 SCC 65, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 838 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “AES”].
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may not be workable and consistent with the many policy compromises
that have been made throughout the Act. Moreover, many administrative
compromises have to be made in formulating tax rules and in interpreting
them because the income tax is levied on an annual basis even though
many business transactions remain ongoing for many years. Hence a first
best answer to a tax interpretation problem may need to give way to a
second best (or third or fourth best) answer that is reached only after
balancing a number of competing considerations.
A question that has troubled the CRA and tax practitioners for many
years, and for which there is no one right answer, is the appropriate tax
treatment of contingent liabilities that have been assumed by a purchaser
of business assets. Daishowa raised this issue. The case involved the sale
of one of Daishowa’s timber businesses. In addition to the business
assets, the purchaser assumed the reforestation liabilities that Daishowa
had incurred in logging the forest tenures that formed part of the
business.
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of the issue raised in the case,
Rothstein J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, light-heartedly
posed the following question in the opening paragraph of his judgment,
“In this appeal, the Court is called upon to answer an age-old question: If
a tree falls in the forest and you are not around to replant it, how does it
affect your taxes?”7 In the Tax Court of Canada, Miller J. was more
direct in acknowledging the difficulty of resolving the issue. In a
judgment following the Supreme Court’s decision, in which Daishowa
was asking for an increase in the costs awarded, Miller J. stated, “The
fundamental issue at the Tax Court of Canada was not complex in its
formulation, but the resolution required a Cirque du Soleilian acrobatic
twisting and turning to grapple it to the ground.”8 In spite of the need for
twisting and turning, Miller J. reached a compromise judgment in
resolving the interpretive issue facing the Court. Perhaps because they
were unwilling to engage in the required twisting and turning, and
dashing the hopes of those who had thought this case would resolve the
question of the appropriate tax treatment of the assumption of contingent
liabilities in an asset purchase, the judges of the Supreme Court finessed
the issue by re-characterizing the taxpayer’s transaction at issue in the
case as not involving a contingent liability. Ironically, in doing so the
7

Daishowa, supra, note 4, at para. 1.
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Supreme Court not only did not assist in resolving this important and
difficult interpretive question, but added an additional layer of
complexity to its resolution.
As a heuristic for promoting clear thinking about the resolution of
tax cases, tax commentators, and even judges, sometimes note that
applying tax law to transactions involves two steps: first, characterizing
the taxpayer’s transaction for tax purposes and second, determining the
governing tax law, which often involves an issue of statutory
interpretation. In Daishowa, at the Tax Court level all of the parties
assumed the case involved an issue of determining the governing tax
law: how should contingent liabilities assumed on the purchase of
business assets be treated for tax purposes, and in particular, should their
value have to be included in the vendor’s proceeds of disposition? Justice
Miller gave an extended judgment dealing with this issue and in holding
for the Minister of National Revenue held that the taxpayer should have
to include the value of the assumed reforestation obligations in the
proceeds of disposition received for the forest tenures. This was also the
basic issue dealt with by the majority in the Federal Court of Appeal,
who also held in favour of the Minister. The dissent in the Court of
Appeal, however, dealt with the case as if it raised an issue relating to the
proper characterization of the taxpayer’s transaction; namely, whether the
reforestation obligations assumed by the purchaser should be
characterized as contingent liabilities for tax purposes or whether they
should be treated as an integral characteristic of the assigned forest
tenures themselves and thus simply have the effect of reducing the value
of those tenures. On the basis that they should be treated as an integral
part of the forest tenures, Mainville J.A. would have held for the
taxpayers.
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on the question of
whether “the reforestation liabilities [are] to be included in the proceeds
of disposition because the vendor is relieved of a liability or are they
integral to and run with the forest tenures?”9 Hence the Court indicated it
was not interested in hearing arguments on the question that the Tax
Court and the majority in the Federal Court of Appeal had dealt with,
namely, the appropriate tax treatment of assumed contingent liabilities on
an asset sale, but instead was treating the case as one involving only the
characterization of the taxpayer’s transaction. This was an issue that was

9
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not argued or even mentioned in the Tax Court. In a subsequent judgment
relating to the awarding of costs in the case, Miller J. referred to the
Supreme Court of Canada as having “introduced a novel concept of
‘embedded’”10 into the analysis of the case and noted that at the Tax
Court level he “did not have the benefit of any argument with respect to
an ‘embedded’ liability”.11
2. Facts
The facts of Daishowa are straightforward; even so, to highlight the
central issue the following is a somewhat simplified version. The
taxpayer, Daishowa-Marubeni International Ltd., operated a timber
division in the province of Alberta in which it harvested logs and
manufactured finished timber. In 1999 it sold all of the assets of this
division of its business. Among the assets was a forest tenure granted by
the Alberta government. Under this forest tenure, Daishowa was licensed
to cut and remove timber from designated provincial Crown land. The
regulatory regime that governed forest tenures in Alberta required the
licensee to reforest the areas it harvested (the “reforestation liability”).
This reforestation liability would generally not be completely discharged
until eight to 14 years after cutting the timber and its eventual total cost
would be contingent on a number of factors such as the intervening
weather and other environmental conditions. The regulatory regime also
provided that the government of Alberta had to consent to the assignment
of a forest tenure and that such consent would only be given if the
purchaser of the tenure assumed the seller’s outstanding reforestation
liabilities. Consequently, when Daishowa assigned its forest tenure to the
purchaser of this division of its business, the obligation to finish
reforesting the areas Daishowa had logged was also assumed by the
purchaser.
The purchaser’s initial offer for all of the assets of the business was
$180 million cash minus the estimated reforestation liabilities. However,
on the advice of Daishowa’s tax advisers, the purchase price in the final
agreement was stated to be $169 million and a term in the agreement
simply provided that the purchaser would assume the relevant
reforestation obligations. The parties agreed that the reforestation
liabilities had a value of about $11 million.
10
11

Daishowa-Marubeni, supra, note 8, at para. 15.
Id., at para. 24.
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Daishowa reported the proceeds of disposition of the business assets
as being the cash it received, $169 million. It allocated this amount
among the assets. In the purchase agreement, $20 million was allocated
to the forest tenure. (Presumably it would have been $31 million if there
were no outstanding reforestation liabilities.) Consistent with its
administrative position relating to the tax treatment of assumed liabilities
in an asset purchase, the Minister of National Revenue reassessed
Daishowa and added the value of the contingent reforestation liabilities
assumed by the purchaser, namely, $11 million, to Daishowa’s proceeds
of disposition. Hence the Minister treated the forest tenures as having
been sold for $31 million — $20 million cash plus $11 million
representing the value to Daishowa of the purchaser assuming the
outstanding reforestation liabilities.
The CRA’s assessing practice with respect to the assumption of
contingent liabilities in a purchase and sale transaction has been set out
in numerous technical interpretations that are invariably discussed and
analyzed in articles on the tax consequences of the purchase and sale of a
business.12 Basically, the CRA requires the fair market value of contingent liabilities to be included in the vendor’s proceeds of disposition at
the date of the sale. However, it does not allow the purchaser to add the
value of the contingent liabilities to the cost basis of the assets until the
liabilities have been paid. Moreover, it does not allow the seller to deduct
the amount that it paid (usually in the form of a reduced cash purchase
price for the sold assets) to have the purchaser assume the liabilities. This
assessing practice can lead to the seller being taxed on income it has
never received.
The tax bar has always been concerned about the CRA’s assessing
practice, but it has been of particular concern to resource industry
companies because future reforestation, reclamation and other
environmental obligations are typically assumed on asset sales in that
See, for example, Clark Hollands & Ada Lam, “Contingent Liabilities Assumed on
Purchase of Business Assets: Reconciling Tax Law with Economic Reality”, 2004 British Columbia
Tax Conference (Vancouver: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2004), c. 2; Jocelyn Blanchet, “Purchase
and Sale of Assets: The Treatment to the Vendor of Contingent Liabilities Assumed”, 2009 Tax
Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2010), c. 11; Daniel Lang & Charles Taylor, “Tax
Issues in Purchase and Sale Agreements”, 2011 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 2012), c. 14; Shane Onufrechuk, “Purchase and Sale of a Business: Selected Topics”,
2011 British Columbia Tax Conference (Vancouver: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011), c. 9C;
Matthew Peters & Mariam Al-Shikarchy, “Restrictive Covenants and the Assumption of Liabilities
in Purchase and Sale Transactions”, 2013 Ontario Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 2013), c. 6.
12
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industry. Apparently, following its win in the Tax Court the CRA became
emboldened in reassessing taxpayers in the oil and gas industry that had
sold properties with reclamation obligations attached to them. The
Canadian Association of Petroleum Products Producers, one of the many
interveners at the Supreme Court of Canada, reported that there were
outstanding reassessments in the industry totalling several billion
dollars.13
To provide some context for the specific issue raised in the case, the
following is a brief description of the tax treatment of forest tenures
generally. Licences to remove timber (forest tenures) are taxed as “timber
resource property” under the Act.14 Timber resources properties are
treated as depreciable capital property and their capital cost can be
depreciated on a straight-line basis at a rate of 15 per cent a year.15
However, unlike most other depreciable properties, if they are sold for
more than their capital cost the excess amount is not taxed as a capital
gain but instead is taxed as ordinary income.16 Upon the sale of a timber
resource property the owner must include in income the total amount by
which the “proceeds of disposition” of the property exceed its
undepreciated capital cost.17 Like the more general provision dealing
with the sale of capital property,18 for this purpose “proceeds of
disposition” is defined as “the sale price of property that has been
sold”.19 Hence the issue in the case might be restated as whether the
assumption of a contingent liability by a purchaser should be treated as
part of the sale price of property that has been sold. Of course there
might be other tax consequences for the seller when a purchaser assumes
a contingent liability in an asset purchase and the tax consequences to the
purchaser are also important and contentious. With this case the tax
community was hoping all of this would be sorted out, but as we describe
below, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue entirely.

13

Daishowa-Marubeni, supra, note 8, at para. 12.
Income Tax Act, supra, note 2, s. 13(21) “timber resource property”.
15
Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C., c. 945, Sch. II, Class 33.
16
Income Tax Act, supra, note 2, s. 39(1)(a)(iv) excludes a timber resource property from
capital gain treatment.
17
Id., ss. 13(1), 13(21) “undepreciated capital cost” (variable G).
18
Id., s. 54 “proceeds of disposition”.
19
Id., s. 13(21) “proceeds of disposition”.
14
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(a) Tax Court of Canada20
As mentioned above, in reassessing Daishowa upon the sale of its
forest tenures, the CRA included in its proceeds of disposition not only
the cash it received ($20 million) but also the value to Daishowa of the
purchaser assuming its outstanding reforestation liabilities ($11 million).
In contesting the reassessment in the Tax Court, Daishowa made
three arguments:
(1) The reforestation liabilities should not be included in the proceeds
of disposition since they were contingent and the fair market value of
the liabilities was not determinable at the time of closing.
(2) Alternatively, if the value of the reforestation liabilities were to be
included in the proceeds, that value should be much less than the
accounting estimate of $11 million.
(3) And, also alternatively, if the value of the contingent liabilities were
included in the proceeds of disposition, Daishowa should be entitled
to an offsetting deduction from income.
On the first issue, in upholding the Minister’s reassessment, Miller J.
had little difficulty concluding that the assumption of the reforestation
liability was part of the consideration for the sale of the forest tenure. In
reaching this conclusion he made the following points:


The definition of proceeds of disposition in the Act was clearly broad
enough to include any consideration, including an assumption of a
liability.21



Daishowa admitted that if they had to pay this liability, that is, if the
purchaser had not assumed it, they would have insisted on increased
cash or other consideration for the sale of the forest tenures.22



The assumption of Daishowa’s contingent liability by the purchaser
can be regarded as separate consideration for the sale. The
reforestation obligations do not “flow” with the forest tenure even

20

Daishowa-Marubeni International Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] T.C.J. No. 228, 2010 TCC 317

(T.C.C.).
21
22

Id., at para. 25.
Id., at para. 24.
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though the provincial regulatory regime requires a purchaser to
assume them.23


The fact that in the final agreement the parties specifically excluded
the assumption of liability from the purchase price is irrelevant. The
consideration for the sale is what it is regardless of what the parties
state in their contract. To hold otherwise would be to “put form over
substance”.24



No principle of tax law holds that, because the eventual value of
consideration given as proceeds of disposition is uncertain, it
therefore should not be valued at the time of sale and treated as
proceeds of disposition. Although the uncertainty should be taken
into account in determining the fair market value of the
consideration, the fact that the value of a contingent liability cannot
be determined with certainty does not mean that it should be treated
as being zero.25

On the second issue Miller J. agreed with Daishowa that the $11
million accounting estimate of the reforestation liabilities, which was
agreed upon by the parties, should not necessarily be treated as the value
of the contingent liability for tax purposes. He reviewed a wide range of
factors that he suggested justified deeply discounting the $11 million
figure, at least that part of it attributable to the long-term reforestation
liability.26 Frankly, this part of his judgment is somewhat difficult to
understand, and since it was dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal, is
not dealt with by the Supreme Court, and is not relevant to our
concluding analysis of this case, we will say no more about it.
The third point argued by Daishowa at the Tax Court of Canada was
that if it was required to include an amount for the reforestation liabilities
in its proceeds of disposition for the sold property it should be entitled to
a corresponding deduction from income. The logic of this position,
Daishowa argued, was that by paying the purchaser with assets to assume
the liabilities it had effectively paid off the liabilities and since the
liabilities represented a current expense they should be entitled to a
current deduction for that amount.

23
24
25
26

Id., at para. 26.
Id., at para. 27.
Id., at paras. 28-39.
Id., at paras. 40-42.
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Justice Miller was clearly confused by this argument. He referred to
it as “somewhat circuitous” in that Daishowa appeared to be arguing that
“it was not only the vendor of assets and a recipient of consideration”.27
He notes that Daishowa did not pay the purchaser “separately to incur the
reforestation expenditures” but that “[t]his deal was for the sale of capital
assets: the assumption of the reforestation liability was simply part of the
capital transaction”.28 He exclaimed that “to view the transaction as
payment for the reforestation costs by the transfer of the forest tenures …
is an Alice in Wonderland topsy turvy approach”.29 Moreover, even if the
transfer of the forest tenures could be regarded in part as payment for the
purchaser assuming the liabilities, Miller J. reasoned that “the payment
smacks more of an enduring benefit than current expense of the actual
reforestation”.30
Justice Miller seemed to recognize that by taxing Daishowa on the
value of having the purchaser assume the reforestation liabilities but not
allowing them a deduction for the expenses they represented Daishowa
would be paying tax on income it had not earned. (We agree and explain
why this is the case below, and argue that for this reason Daishowa
should have been allowed to deduct this amount.) He stated frankly that
he agreed with Daishowa “that there is a certain lack of symmetry in how
the assumption of the reforestation liability is treated for tax purposes. …
the value of the assumption of that very liability to incur those costs falls
into income as proceeds in one fell swoop, with no recognition that the
income recipient has no future opportunity to deduct such expenses”.31
Somewhat oddly, although not dealing directly with this incongruity, he
stated that he used this economic reality “to justify my view that the face
amount of the assumption of the liability should be discounted”.32
(b) Federal Court of Appeal33
A three-judge panel at the Federal Court of Appeal was divided in its
analysis of the case. The majority, in a judgment written by Nadon J.A.
27

Id., at para. 44.
Id.
29
Id., at para. 45.
30
Id.
31
Id., at para. 47.
32
Id.
33
Daishowa-Marubeni International Ltd. v. Canada, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1351, 2011 FCA
267, 2011 D.T.C. 5157 (F.C.A.).
28

346

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015), 68 S.C.L.R. (2d)

and concurred with by Layden-Stevenson J.A., agreed with the trial
judge that the value of the assumed reforestation liability should be
included in Daishowa’s proceeds of disposition for its business assets.
However, contrary to the holding of the trial court judge, the Court of
Appeal held that value of the assumed liabilities was the amount agreed
upon by the parties (even though this might not be their fair market
value), namely, $11 million, and not the much lesser discounted amount
arrived at by the trial judge. The Court of Appeal also agreed with the
trial judge that Daishowa was not entitled to a deduction for having
effectively paid off its reforestation liabilities with assets.
In reaching the conclusion that the assumption of the reforestation
liabilities constituted part of the consideration for the forest tenures,
Nadon J.A. simply summarized and quoted from the trial judge’s reasons
for so holding and stated that he could “find no error in the Judge’s
reasoning”.34
However, contrary to the trial judge’s finding that the value of the
reforestation liability was less than the amount agreed to by the parties,
he went on to hold that on his reading of the contract between the parties
they had agreed that $11 million was the amount to be paid for the
assumption of the reforestation liabilities and, therefore, he held, it was
not open for the trial judge to discount this amount. He stated that if “the
parties agree to accept a certain amount as consideration” for property in
an asset sale, then that amount must be accepted by the CRA. 35
Underlining this point, he went on to say, that “[i]f the parties attribute
no value to a future liability, then there is nothing to be added to the
seller’s proceeds of disposition for the purposes of taxation.”36 That is to
say, he held that in valuing the contingent liability the only question is
what value the parties assigned to it in their agreement of purchase and
sale.
Justice Nadon then turned to the third issue raised by Daishowa at
the Tax Court of Canada, which he stated as follows: “Was the appellant
entitled to claim either a deduction from its income or include the capital
expenditure amount paid for having the purchasers [Tolko] assume the
reforestation liability in its adjusted cost base?”37 Just to be clear about
the taxpayer’s argument: The taxpayer argued, in the alternative, that if it
34
35
36
37

Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 66.
Id., at para. 79.
Id., at para. 34.
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was required to include the reforestation obligation amounts in its
proceeds of disposition, then it should be able to deduct an offsetting
amount. Daishowa argued that if it had discharged the reforestation
liabilities by reforesting it would have been entitled to deduct all
expenses incurred as current expenses. Instead of paying off the liability
directly, it discharged it indirectly by paying the purchaser to assume the
liabilities. It paid the purchaser for this assumption of liabilities by
accepting a lower purchase price for the forest tenures than it would
otherwise be entitled to receive; in effect, that part of the value of the
transferred forest tenures that the Minister alleged was paid for by the
purchaser assuming the reforestation liabilities must necessarily
represent consideration for the assumption of the reforestation
liabilities.38 (As we observed above, we agree with the taxpayer’s
argument on this point. We explain why below.)
Justice Nadon rejected the taxpayer’s alternative argument by again
adopting the reasoning of the Tax Court: “the judge decided against the
appellant on this point because of his view that the transaction was one
for the sale of capital assets and that the assumption of the reforestation
liability was ‘simply part of that capital transaction’… . I see no basis to
disagree with the Judge’s reasoning”.39 He said, “[i]n the present matter,
it is my view that it is an enduring benefit to the appellant to be relieved
of a long term reforestation liability associated with the forest tenure.”40
Further, he explained, “[t]he forest tenure, being a piece of land with a
forest on it, has a capital nature. The reforestation liability, by law, passes
with the ownership of the tenure itself. Hence, the reforestation liability
also has a capital nature.”41
Both the Tax Court judge and the majority of the Federal Court of
Appeal dealt with this case as if it raised an issue of statutory
interpretation, namely, how should contingent liabilities assumed on the
sale of business assets be treated for tax purposes? The dissenting judge
in the Federal Court of Appeal, Mainville J.A., however, completely
finessed this issue by treating the case as one involving the
characterization of the taxpayer’s transaction. He did not necessarily
disagree with the majority’s view of how assumed contingent liabilities
should be taxed. Instead, he held that the case did not involve the
38
39
40
41

Id., at para. 86.
Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 89.
Id.
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assumption of a contingent liability at all, but involved the sale of a
capital asset, namely, a forest tenure, to which a liability to reforest was
“inextricably linked” or as he sometimes put it was an “integral part of”
or was “embedded in”. That is to say, he held that assumption of the
reforestation liability could not form a separate component of the consideration for the sale of the forest tenure because that liability was not
distinct from the forest tenure itself. The effect of the liability was simply
to depress the value of the forest tenure much in the same way that the
value of an asset is depressed if it is in need of repair. He noted that no
one would suggest that a seller of an asset in need of repair should be
treated as having disposed of the asset for its value plus the cost of the
needed repairs. In the same way, in this case, the fact that there was a
future liability that the purchaser assumed in purchasing the asset should
not be treated as separate from the asset itself and the value to the seller
of having it discharged added to the proceeds of disposition.42 The effect
of the reforestation liabilities was simply to depress the selling price of
the asset but aside from that it had no tax consequences.43
Why did he conclude that this liability should be treated as
embedded in the asset instead of being a distinct liability? The main
reason appears to be that in order for the seller to obtain provincial
government approval of the transfer of a forest tenure the purchaser had
to agree to assume all outstanding reforestation liabilities.44
He supported his conclusion by noting that sections of a statute
should be interpreted in a way that is “harmonious with the act as a
whole” and that “promotes symmetry and fairness”.45 He observed that
the approach taken by the majority and the Tax Court resulted in a lack
of symmetry since, and here he quoted directly from Miller J.’s
judgment, “the value of the [assumption of the reforestation liability] …
falls into income as proceeds … with no recognition that the income
recipient has no future opportunity to deduct such expenses”.46
Although it was not necessary for him to decide the issue of how the
contingent liabilities would be valued if their discharge were included in
the seller’s proceeds of disposition, he supported his conclusion that the
contingent liabilities should be ignored by noting the incongruity of
the majority’s position that the liabilities should be given the value that
42
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the parties assigned to them in their agreement. He observed that this
position meant that if the parties do not “identify the value of the
reforestation liabilities, those liabilities may well not be included in
the proceeds of disposition and thus escape taxation in the hands of the
vendor, while in circumstances where the parties are transparent in their
transactions and clearly identify the value of the reforestation liabilities,
these would be accordingly included in the vendors taxable proceeds”.47
(c) Supreme Court
This case was argued both at the Tax Court and the Federal Court of
Appeal as a case involving the proper tax treatment of a contingent
liability assumed as part of an asset sale, including whether, if the value
of the liabilities should be treated as part of the proceeds of disposition of
the assets, an amount representing the amount the seller paid the
purchaser for assuming the liabilities could be deducted from the seller’s
income. However, the Supreme Court did not grant leave on this
question. Instead leave was granted only on the question of whether or
not the reforestation liabilities were in fact contingent liabilities. Leave
was granted on the following issues:
1. Are the reforestation liabilities to be included in the proceeds of
disposition because the vendor is relieved of a liability or are they
integral to and run with the forest tenures?
2. Does it make any difference that the parties agreed to a specific
amount of the future reforestation liability?48
What is odd about these questions is that commentators, the taxpayer
in this case, the CRA, and the lower courts in this case conceded that the
question of how a contingent liability assumed on an asset sale was to be
treated for tax purposes was contentious and important. Yet in granting
leave the Supreme Court did not ask the parties to address this issue. The
Court simply asked them to address whether or not the reforestation
liabilities in the case were a contingent liability. One wonders if they had
made up their minds that it was not a contingent liability or if they
believed that the tax treatment of contingent liabilities was
straightforward and therefore concluded in advance that if they held that
47
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the reforestation liabilities were contingent liabilities they would not
require arguments about how they should be taxed.
In any event, in holding for the taxpayer a nine-member Supreme
Court bench unanimously reversed the Federal Court of Appeal. Justice
Rothstein, writing for the Court, followed both the conclusion and the
reasoning of dissenting Mainville J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal. He
added no new reasoning or insights. Justice Rothstein held that the
reforestation liabilities could not be severed from the forest tenures
themselves but were embedded in them because of the policy of the
Alberta government that required a purchaser of forest tenures to assume
all outstanding reforestation liabilities. Like Mainville J.A., he supported
his holding by an analogy to an asset in need of repair and to the
asymmetrical tax treatment that resulted from the holding of the majority
in the Federal Court of Appeal.
Justice Rothstein acknowledged “[a]s a matter of principle, the
assumption of a vendor’s liability by a purchaser may constitute part of
the sale price and therefore part of the vendor’s proceeds of disposition.”49 He illustrated this point with a simple example of a property that
is encumbered by a mortgage. If a purchaser pays for the property by
paying some cash and by assuming the outstanding mortgage, then the
amount of the cash and the amount of the mortgage liability assumed
would both be included in the vendor’s proceeds of disposition.50 This is
an odd point for Rothstein J. to make in this case since the case did not
involve a fixed liability, like a mortgage, but a contingent liability. The
tax treatment of the assumption of fixed liabilities is indeed relatively
straightforward, in part, since the seller will have claimed a deduction or
increased the cost of its assets in an amount equal to the amount of the
fixed liability. The tricky question is the tax treatment of the assumption
of contingent liabilities where even though the liability will have accrued
economically and diminished the value of the business of which the
assets are part, the seller has not yet claimed a deduction or had any
addition to the cost of its assets (in most cases because the liability is too
contingent to be recognized for tax purposes). That was the circumstance
in Daishowa.
However, as mentioned, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of
the tax treatment of contingent liabilities altogether by finding that the
reforestation obligations were not liabilities, but rather they were future
49
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costs embedded in the land tenures. As stated by Rothstein J., “[T]he
reforestation obligations were not a distinct existing debt, like a
mortgage, but were embedded in the tenure so as to be a future cost
associated with ownership of the tenure.”51 Following the reasoning of
Mainville J.A., Rothstein J. concluded that the reforestation obligations
were not contingent liabilities but embedded in the forest tenures
themselves since “Alberta’s regulatory scheme … prevents a vendor
from selling a forest tenure without also assigning the reforestation
obligations that have arisen from past harvesting.”52
The fact that Daishowa and the purchaser had agreed to an estimated
future cost for the reforestation obligation and reduced the price
accordingly and the fact that Daishowa had estimated the cost of the
future reforestation obligations when computing income for accounting
purposes were found to be irrelevant.53 Furthermore, the question of
whether the reforestation obligation was a contingent or fixed liability
was not considered relevant.54
Also following Mainville J.A., and in support of his conclusion,
Rothstein J. analogized forest tenures with reforestation obligations to
properties in need of repair. No one would argue that a seller should have
to add the cost of needed repairs to the proceeds of assets sold on the
grounds that the purchaser had assumed those costs from the seller when
the asset was sold, even if, as Justice Rothstein notes, the repairs were
required by law.55 In oral argument the Minister argued that the repair
analogy was inapt since unlike a repair in this case the taxpayer had
incurred the liability to reforest before the sale.56 But Rothstein J.,
acknowledging an oral argument made by Mr. Meghji for the Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers, stated that the Minister’s attempt to
distinguish the reforestation liabilities from a repair assumed that
reforestation liabilities were a distinct existing debt and in fact they were
not but instead they “were embedded in the tenure so as to be a future
cost associated with ownership of the tenure”.57
As noted above, the Minister’s assessing position with respect to the
assumption of contingent liabilities in asset sales was that although the
51
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value of the contingent liability (in this case the $11 million estimated
costs of the reforestation obligations) assumed by the purchaser should
be included in the vendor’s proceeds of disposition, it should not be
included in the purchaser’s adjusted cost base (at least until the purchaser
actually incurred the expenses). Justice Rothstein supported his holding
that the obligations should be treated as being embedded in the forest
tenures because it avoided this asymmetrical tax treatment. He noted that
under the Minister’s approach, if the purchaser’s cost base was $20
million, the cash amount paid, but upon sale the proceeds had to include
not only this cash amount but also the assumption of the future
reforestation costs then if the purchaser sold the forest tenure the day
following the purchase from Daishowa the proceeds would be $31
million (assuming the reforestation obligations were still $11 million).
The purchaser would be taxed on $11 million of income it clearly had not
received.58 Justice Rothstein noted that the avoidance of asymmetry was
not dispositive, but that, again paraphrasing Mainville J.A., “an
interpretation of the Act that promotes symmetry and fairness through a
harmonious taxation scheme is to be preferred over an interpretation
which promotes neither value”.59
3. Analysis
(a) The Supreme Court’s Unfortunate Mischaracterization of the
Taxpayer’s Transaction
It is unfortunate that instead of dealing with the question of the tax
treatment of contingent liabilities the Supreme Court re-characterized the
taxpayer’s transaction as one not involving a contingent liability. As we
argue below they were wrong to re-characterize the transaction — it was
clearly a contingent liability — but further the tax treatment of assumed
contingent liabilities was the issue that needed to be resolved in this case.
A good deal of uncertainty surrounds this issue; it is often an important
one in the purchase and sale of business assets; and, in many cases the
CRA’s present administrative practice taxes taxpayers on income they
have not received. The Court missed an opportunity to clarify the
application of tax principles to these transactions. Although the Court
might have characterized the transaction as involving liabilities
58
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embedded in an asset in order to reach what they regarded as a sensible
result, if they had grappled with the appropriate tax treatment of
contingent liabilities presumably a sensible result would have been
reached as well. As a result of their failure, either another taxpayer will
have to take a case to the Supreme Court to clarify the tax treatment of
contingent liabilities or its treatment will have to be clarified by
legislative amendment. Also, as a result of the decision, not only has the
tax treatment of contingent liabilities not been resolved but also a new
layer of complexity has been added to the determination of the
appropriate tax treatment of the assumption of liabilities in an asset sale:
now as a preliminary matter taxpayers have to determine if they are
dealing with contingent liabilities or liabilities that are embedded in the
transferred asset. Prior to this case no one assumed this distinction made
any difference for tax purposes. In a hearing on whether the award of
costs in this case should be increased, Miller J. noted that the Supreme
Court “introduced a novel concept of ‘embedded’” in resolving the
case.60
Also unfortunately, the Court provided almost no guidance as to
when a liability associated with an asset will be considered embedded in
that property for tax purposes. In this case Rothstein J. stated that the
liabilities were embedded since the purchaser of the assets was required
to assume them under Alberta’s regulatory scheme for forest tenures, but
he went on to say that “I would certainly not foreclose the possibility that
obligations associated with a property right could be embedded in the
property right without there being a statute, regulation or government
policy that expressly restricts a vendor from selling the property right
without assigning those obligations to the purchaser.”61 But beyond this
the Court provided no examples or gave any guidance to assist taxpayers
in determining whether a liability is embedded.
But most importantly, and unfortunately, the decision is wrong. In
ordinary usage Daishowa’s reforestation obligations were a contingent
liability. In their own financial statements Daishowa treated them as
contingent liabilities. And in law, given the usual legal meaning assigned
to the terms “liabilities” and “contingencies” the reforestation obligations
were contingent liabilities. There is no question they represented a
liability. Daishowa had cut the timber in the forest tenures and had
a future obligation to reforest. Although what amounts to a contingent
60
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liability has been the subject of countless cases, normally a payment will
be regarded as contingent if there is some uncertainty about whether it
will have to be made, what amount will have to be paid, and when the
payment will have to be made. In this case there was significant
uncertainty about how much would have to be paid in discharging the
reforestation obligations and when it would have to be paid. Indeed,
although Daishowa deducted these liabilities in its own financial
statements, the reason it could not deduct them for tax purposes was
because they were a contingent liability for tax purposes.62 If the
reforestation obligations were contingent liabilities so long as they had to
be discharged by Daishowa, why should their characterization change
when they were assigned to a purchaser?
Justice Rothstein notes that the effect of the liabilities was to reduce
the value of the forest tenures. He suggests that because a purchaser
would necessarily pay less for the forest tenures because of the
reforestation obligations these obligations are embedded in the
property.63 However, the effect on the value of the asset does not
distinguish these obligations from a contingent liability. Anytime a
purchaser buys an asset and assumes a liability they will necessarily pay
less (cash) for the asset. This is because the assumption of the liability is
payment, in part, for the asset. This is exactly what happened in
Daishowa. The purchaser paid less (cash) for the assets because they
assumed the reforestation liability. Justice Rothstein’s attempt to support
his embedded claim by noting that “the reforestation obligations are
simply a future cost tied to the tenure that depresses the value of the
tenure”64 begs the question. It assumes the obligation is not a contingent
liability. Contingent liabilities have the same effect.
The only justification the Court gave for treating the reforestation
liabilities as future costs embedded in the forest tenures as opposed to
contingent liabilities was that upon a sale of the forest tenures the
purchaser was required to assume the reforestation liabilities.65 But why
should that matter? As a matter of ordinary usage in referring to the
obligations, or more importantly as a matter of tax principles, why
62
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should it matter if the purchaser of assets voluntarily acquires obligations
as a result of negotiations or is required by law to assume the
obligations? Why should the fact that they were required to be assumed
change their characterization from contingent liabilities to future costs
embedded in the assets? Certainly the Court did not give any justification
in terms of tax principles or any other reasons why this distinction should
matter.
In supporting its conclusion, the analogy the Court makes to repairs
is not persuasive. Justice Rothstein stated that “[t]he obligations — much
like needed repairs — are a future cost embedded in the forest tenure that
serves to depress the tenure’s value at the time of sale.”66 But of course
this is just a description not a reason for treating the liabilities like
repairs. In his oral argument the Minister distinguished the obligations
from repairs on the grounds that in the case of the reforestation
obligations the liabilities had been incurred whereas in the case of an
asset in need of repairs no liabilities are incurred until the repair work is
undertaken. Picking up on an argument made by Mr. Meghji for the
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Rothstein J. noted that the
Minister’s attempt to distinguish the reforestation obligations from
repairs “presupposes that the reforestation obligations are a distinct
existing liability”.67 But again this assertion simply asserts a conclusion.
If the Court had found that the reforestation obligations were not a
distinct existing liability on other grounds (and assuming that as a matter
of tax principles that characteristic of the liabilities should be given
significance) the analogy to repairs, although it might illustrate the effect
of the obligations (to diminish the value of the asset), does not provide a
further distinct reason for equating the two cases. Moreover, an obvious
difference between the reforestation obligations and an asset in need of
repair that is repaired by a purchaser is that the reforestation obligations
in this case were a liability that was incurred by the seller whereas the
repairs would be an expense incurred by the purchaser.
What appeared to trouble the Court about the case, and one suspects
accounts for their granting leave to appeal and treating it as a case
involving the characterization of the taxpayer’s transaction, was that the
CRA’s administrative practice with respect to the assumption of contingent liabilities clearly results in an inappropriate tax result. On the
assumption of a contingent liability in the sale of business assets the
66
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CRA requires the seller to include the value of the liability in the
proceeds of disposition of the assets but does not permit the purchaser to
add that amount to the adjusted cost base of the assets until the expenses
are actually incurred. Further, it does not provide the seller with a
deduction for having discharged the liabilities. As the Court notes, this
means if the purchaser sold the assets one day after purchasing them the
purchaser would be taxed on the value of the contingent liabilities
(assuming they had not been settled) even though this amount does not
reflect additional income or a change in the value of the assets during its
ownership.68 After noting this result, Rothstein J. justifies his holding, in
part, by noting, “[t]he conclusion I have reached — that a purchaser’s
assumption of reforestation obligations does not form part of the
vendor’s proceeds of disposition — avoids this asymmetry. Although not
dispositive, as Mainville J.A. recognized in his dissent, an interpretation
of the Act that promotes symmetry and fairness through a harmonious
taxation scheme is to be preferred over an interpretation which promotes
neither value.”69
This justification for holding that the taxpayer’s reforestation
obligations were embedded in the forest tenures is odd for a number of
reasons.
First, Rothstein J. is using an approach to statutory interpretation —
statutes should be interpreted to promote symmetry and fairness — to
justify a particular characterization of the taxpayer’s transaction. The
problem with this strategy is that it solves the fact that the statute might
be unfair only for those cases in which the taxpayer’s transaction can be
re-characterized. In this case, for example, it solves the asymmetry
problem only for those contingent liabilities that can be characterized as
embedded in a related asset. Presumably the asymmetry still exists for
contingent liabilities that cannot be so re-characterized.
Second, the argument assumes there is a general tax principle that the
tax treatment of sellers and purchasers should be symmetrical. But there
is no such principle. Tax principles apply to individual taxpayers. An
equitable tax system attempts to measure the change in the net wealth
(and the value of goods and services consumed in the case of individual
taxpayers) of each taxpayer. It is difficult to see why one taxpayer’s
change of net wealth should ever depend upon the change of net wealth
of another. Further, the tax characteristic of an asset or payment often
68
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changes as it passes from one taxpayer to another. A particular asset
might be inventory of the seller but capital property of the purchaser; a
payment might be a non-deductible personal expense of the payer but
taxable business income of the payee. The application of this principle is
likely to lead to the wrong result in future cases, as it did in this case. As
we explain below, this aspect of the CRA’s assessing position on this
issue is correct. The value of a contingent liability should be added to the
seller’s proceeds of disposition but only added to the purchaser’s
adjusted cost base when the expense is incurred.
A third oddity of this justification for the Court’s holding is that
Rothstein J. refers to Mainville J.A.’s dissent in the Federal Court of
Appeal in noting that an interpretation of the Act that promotes
symmetry should be preferred over one that does not.70 But the
asymmetry that troubled the trial judge, and was of concern to Mainville
J.A., was not the asymmetrical treatment of the seller and purchaser that
resulted from the CRA’s assessing practice but instead was the
asymmetrical treatment in the hands of the seller of the amount paid by
the seller to the purchaser for assuming the contingent liability.
Consistent with the CRA’s assessing practice, the trial judge held that the
seller had to include the value of the assumption of reforestation
liabilities in its proceeds of disposition but that it could not deduct that
value from its income in the year of sale as being an amount paid for the
discharge of the liabilities. That is to say, even though the purchaser had
assumed the liabilities and their value was being treated as consideration
for the sale of assets, the fact that the seller had discharged the liabilities
by paying the purchaser to assume them was not being recognized with
an income deduction. Even though his holding in the case did not
provide a remedy, the trial judge did state, “I agree with the Appellant
that there is a certain lack of symmetry in how the assumption of the
reforestation liability is treated for tax purposes. No deduction is allowed
until costs of reforestation are actually incurred, yet the value of the
assumption of that very liability to incur those costs falls into income as
proceeds in one fell swoop, with no recognition that the income recipient
has no future opportunity to deduct such expenses.”71 This was also the
asymmetry that concerned Mainville J.A. about the majority view in the
70
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Federal Court of Appeal.72 This concern makes sense since the Act
should treat amounts as they relate to a particular taxpayer symmetrically
in order to correctly measure that person’s income. In this case, this
asymmetrical problem is easily solved by allowing the seller a deduction
from income for the amount they have paid to discharge the liabilities, as
we explain below.
(b) How the Assumption of Contingent Liabilities on the Sale of a
Business Should Be Taxed
This is not a paper on the taxation of contingent liabilities assumed
by a purchaser in an asset sale, but in order to place some of the issues
raised in Daishowa in a larger tax context, and to suggest how the Court
might have approached the issues it faced, we briefly discuss how the
assumption of contingent liabilities on the sale of a business should be
taxed.
Like all tax rules, the rules governing the assumption of contingent
liabilities should be consistent with both general tax principles and those
specific principles that underlie the major structural features of the Act.
The rules should also be easy to administer. To reduce tax-induced
behaviour and to minimize arbitrary line drawing they should also be
consistent with closely analogous transactions, namely, a cash-only sale
and a sale involving the assumption of a fixed liability.
At least in a straightforward case, there is no controversy about the
tax treatment of cash-only sales of business assets. Assume a seller has
an asset with a cost basis of $50 and a fair market value of $100. The
seller also has an outstanding bank loan of $10 that is secured with a
charge on the property. If the bank loan had been used to pay current
business expenses it will have been deducted from the seller’s income; if
it was used to purchase an asset it will have been added to the cost basis
of the asset. If a purchaser buys the asset for $100 cash the seller will
have a $50 gain that will be subject to tax. If the seller uses $10 of the
proceeds to pay off its outstanding liabilities there will be no tax
consequences since the seller will have already deducted that $10 or
added it to the cost basis of an asset. The purchaser will have a cost basis
of $100 in the asset acquired.
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Instead of paying all cash, if the purchaser assumes the liability, the
same result should be reached. The seller will only receive $90 cash but
by assuming the $10 liability the purchaser has effectively paid $100 for
the assets and that should be reflected in the gain that the seller reports
and in the purchaser’s cost of the assets acquired. The obvious point is
that the value of liabilities assumed by the purchaser should be included
in the price paid for the assets. In this case the seller has received $90
cash plus $10 of liability relief. The seller will have also either deducted
the amount of the liability if it was used for current expenses or added it
to the cost basis of assets. When the purchaser repays the loan there will
be no tax consequences since the amount of that liability has been
reflected in the cost of the assets.
The tax equivalence between the cash-only sale and the cash and
assumption of fixed liability sale should presumably also apply to the
assumption of a liability that is contingent, to the extent possible.
However, that is where the analysis gets more difficult for two reasons.
First, if the seller has a contingent liability the value of the business will
be less than the fair market value of the assets, but unlike the case of a
fixed liability the seller will not have claimed a deduction for this
diminishment in the value of the business nor will it have been added to
the cost of the assets. Generally, contingent liabilities are not recognized
for tax purposes until they become determinable. Second, although the
parties will presumably assign a value to the contingent liability in
determining how much cash the seller is entitled to, the final cost of the
business to the purchaser will be uncertain until the liability becomes
determinable. Although there are a number of ways these problems could
be dealt with, one obvious way is to include the estimated value of the
contingent liability in the seller’s proceeds of disposition but to avoid
taxing the seller on income it has not received by allowing the seller to
deduct the amount it notionally pays the purchaser to assume the
liabilities. With regard to the second problem, the purchaser could be
required to wait until the contingencies become determinable before
adding any amount relating to the assumption of liabilities to the cost
basis of the assets acquired.
To elaborate slightly on the correct treatment of contingent liabilities
assumed in a sale of business assets, we will briefly review the major
questions that both the Tax Court and the majority in the Federal Court of
Appeal dealt with in this case.
Should the amount of an assumed contingent liability be included in
the seller’s proceeds of disposition? In the case of a fixed liability the
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answer to this question is easy. Assume a seller owes an amount to a
third party, let’s say $10. If a purchaser offers to pay $100 for the assets
and the seller uses $10 to pay off the liability, or the purchaser pays $90
and offers to assume the liability, the seller is equally as well off. Clearly
the purchaser’s assumption of liabilities has value to the seller. The seller
has been relieved of an obligation and the amount should be included in
the seller’s proceeds of disposition. In this case all the judges recognized
this and indeed Rothstein J. said in the Supreme Court that “[i]t is
beyond dispute that, as a matter of principle, the assumption of a
vendor’s liability by a purchaser may constitute part of the sale price and
therefore part of the vendor’s proceeds of disposition … .”73
Although the case for including the assumption of a fixed liability in
the proceeds of disposition is clear, in this case Daishowa argued it
should not have to include a contingent liability in the proceeds of
disposition. It is hard to understand its reasoning. The fact that a liability
might be subject to some contingency does not detract from the fact that
relief from that liability has some value, in some cases a huge amount of
value. The fact that a seller is prepared to accept an assumption of a
contingent liability as consideration indicates it has value and
presumably the seller has made a judgment about what that value is and
it will be reflected in the amount of cash it receives. In this case Miller J.
gave convincing reasons for holding that the assumption of contingent
liabilities should form part of the proceeds of disposition of an asset and
the majority in the Federal Court of Appeal adopted his conclusion and
reasoning.
What amount should be included in the proceeds of disposition in
respect of assumed contingent liabilities? The answer to this question is
as obvious as the answer to the question of whether the assumption of
contingent liabilities should constitute proceeds of disposition: the fair
market value of those liabilities. What other possible answer is there?
The Federal Court of Appeal held that the amount included in the
proceeds should be the amount that the parties have agreed to assign to
the contingent liabilities in their agreement of purchase and sale. This
makes no sense. Indeed, it would seem to be inconsistent for the Court to
hold that the seller must include the assumption of a contingent liability
in the proceeds of disposition but then hold that the parties are free to
assign whatever value they wish to such consideration. What if the
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parties assign a value of zero? Moreover, if parties are allowed to assign
values to assets without regard to their relative fair market value
invariably they will be able to arbitrage the tax system since the assets
might have different tax treatments in the hands of each party. Prices for
individual assets will be chosen that reduce the overall tax liability of the
transaction (given the tax position of each party) and then the resulting
tax savings will be shared between the parties by manipulating the
overall price charged.
Should the seller be able to deduct the amount of the assumed
contingent liabilities? This was the taxpayer’s argument in Daishowa at
both the Tax Court and the Federal Court of Appeal where the argument
was relevant since those judges held that the assumed liabilities had to be
included in the taxpayer’s proceeds of disposition. The taxpayer argued
that by paying the purchaser with assets (by accepting a reduction in the
cash consideration) to assume the liabilities, it had effectively paid off
the liabilities and since the liabilities represented a current expense they
should be entitled to a current deduction for that amount. Neither the Tax
Court judge nor the majority in the Federal Court of Appeal took this
argument very seriously. Yet, the argument must surely be correct.
One way to think about this issue is that if the seller had sold for cash
only and then paid off the contingent liability (assuming this was
possible) the seller would be able to claim a current deduction for the
payment. Why should the tax treatment be any different if the seller
discharges this liability by having the purchaser assume it? The seller has
discharged the liabilities by paying with assets (by taking less cash for
the assets). In these circumstances, if the seller would have been entitled
to a deduction on payment of the liability, why should it not be granted a
deduction at the time of the sale? Again, to the extent possible the
assumption of a contingent liability should be treated the same as an allcash sale.
Another way to think about this problem is that unlike the case of a
fixed liability, with a contingent liability, although the seller has a
liability that has had the effect of reducing the value of the business, it
has not yet obtained a deduction for this decline in net wealth since the
liability is too uncertain to be recognized for tax purposes. Therefore,
upon the sale of the business assets, when the contingent liability will be
valued, the seller should be entitled to a deduction for this decline in net
wealth.
As the taxpayer argued in this case, if a seller has to include the
value of the assumption of the contingent liabilities in proceeds of
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disposition but is not given a deduction for the discharge of the
contingent liability, it will end up paying tax on income it did not realize.
A simple example illustrates this. Assume a taxpayer has an asset with a
cost of $0 and a fair market value of $100. It also has an outstanding
contingent liability valued at $100. Its net wealth position is zero. If the
taxpayer sells the asset and pays off the liability its net wealth would
remain unchanged and it would have no tax liability; the $100 gain
would be offset by the $100 deduction for payment of the liability. But
suppose it sells the asset to a purchaser who agrees in return to pay off
the liability. Again the taxpayer’s net wealth has not changed. Yet if it is
taxed on the $100 gain (the assumption of the liability being treated as
proceeds of disposition for the sale) and it is not allowed to deduct the
current liability that has been discharged, it will be taxed on a $100
change in its net wealth that it has not experienced. This absurd
consequence was avoided in Daishowa — and then only at the Supreme
Court of Canada — because of that Court’s finding that the liabilities
were embedded in the related asset. But what if the liabilities are not
considered to be embedded in the related asset?
In the Court of Appeal, in making the argument that Daishowa
should be entitled to a deduction for the amount of the assumed
contingent liabilities, the taxpayer noted that the amount would have
been deductible as a current expense “if it had paid a sub-contractor to do
the reforestation work”,74 or if it had paid the purchaser separately to
relieve it of its reforestation liability.75 Justice Nadon did not find these
analogies compelling. With respect to the first argument, he noted that
Daishowa did not of course pay a subcontractor to incur the expenses and
tax is imposed on what in fact the taxpayer did “not on what they might
have done”.76 With respect to the second argument, in addition to
pointing out that the taxpayer did not in fact make a separate payment to
the purchaser, he noted that in any event such a payment would “likely
be treated as capital, since it would provide to the appellant the enduring
benefit of no longer having the reforestation liability associated with the
forest tenure”.77
Of course the taxpayer did not do either of these things but the point
of the examples was simply to reveal the logic of allowing a current
74
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deduction. They illustrate that there is no tax principle that would suggest
the amount of the contingent liabilities should not be deductible. Further,
there is no reason for treating the discharge of what would be a current
expense as a capital expenditure. In the case, the taxpayer was going out
of business. Paying to discharge the contingent liabilities would not
result in the earning of income in future years. The expense had no value
beyond the year. Hence it should have been treated as a current not a
capital expenditure.
Should the purchaser be able to add the value of the assumed
contingent liability to the adjusted cost base of the acquired assets and if
so, when? This question was not dealt with directly by the courts in this
case since the seller and not the purchaser was disputing a reassessment.
However, the position of the purchaser was raised in the arguments.
Again, there can be little doubt that the purchaser should be able to add
the value of the assumed contingent liabilities to the adjusted cost base of
the assets acquired. The assumption of the liabilities is part of the
consideration for the assets. The more contentious issue is when should
the seller be able to add the amount to the cost basis — at the date of the
sale or when the liabilities are paid? Arguably the purchaser should be
required to wait until the liabilities are paid before adding the amount to
the adjusted cost base of the assets. This appears to be the wellestablished practice in Canadian tax law and the CRA’s assessing policy.
The tax policy rationale for this rule is that the eventual liabilities are
indefinite and there is no reason why the addition to cost cannot wait
until the actual costs are determined. Moreover, until the purchaser pays
the contingent liabilities it has not incurred any additional burden and
thus should not be able to increase the cost basis of the assets. The purchaser should have to add the expenses incurred in relation to the
contingent liabilities to the cost basis of the assets instead of claiming
them as a current expense since the expenses were not incurred as part of
the purchaser’s business but as part of the consideration paid for the
assets.
The problem of how to treat the assumption of contingent liabilities
in the sale of business assets is a complicated tax issue for the reasons we
set out at the outset of this comment on Daishowa. We have only touched
on a few of the issues. In practice the assumption of contingent liabilities
in an asset sale might involve delayed and contingent payments of the
purchase price, indemnification agreements, placing part of the purchase
funds in escrow, uncertainty about to which purchased assets the
assumption of contingent liabilities relate, confusion about whether a
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particular expense was incurred by the seller or purchaser, and much
more. Nevertheless, Daishowa was an ideal case for the Supreme Court
to establish the basic framework for thinking about all of these issues.
Instead, it completely sidestepped a principled resolution of the basic
issues and added a layer of complexity by inventing the notion that some
contingent liabilities are “embedded” in assets.

III. ENVISION CREDIT UNION V. CANADA: METAPHYSICS IN
PLACE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
1. The Fate of an Egregious Tax Plan
In this case the taxpayer tried to arrange its affairs so that it could
claim a tax deduction for the same expense twice. None of the judges
who heard the case would allow it to do so. In some ways that is no
surprise. Judges, even in most tax cases (but not all tax cases
unfortunately), show concern for upholding the integrity of the law.
However, in this case, perhaps as an indication of their desire to get the
right result, each court offered different reasons in support of their
holding denying the taxpayer the ability to effectively double dip with
respect to its deduction of capital cost allowances.
The basic facts are simple. For good business reasons, namely, to
take advantage of the efficiencies of a larger-sized business, two credit
unions in British Columbia wished to amalgamate into (a corporation
that subsequently became known as) Envision Credit Union. Normally,
this would be a straightforward transaction for tax purposes. Section 87
of the Income Tax Act78 allows companies that amalgamate pursuant to
corporate law to do so without tax consequences. Although the section is
incredibly detailed, basically if the corporation qualifies under the
section, all of the tax accounts and attributes of the two predecessor
companies simply flow into the new amalgamated company. In the
course of preparing for this particular amalgamation, some clever tax
lawyer or accountant came up with an idea about how the amalgamation
might be structured to allow Envision to claim tax deductions even
though they had already been claimed by the predecessor companies.79
78

Income Tax Act, supra, note 2.
In addition to being allowed to claim capital cost allowances that had already been
claimed by its predecessor corporations, Envision also argued that as a result of its tax plan its
“preferred rate amount” should be set at zero even though the predecessor corporations were
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Under section 87 of the Act, when two companies amalgamate, one
of the tax attributes that flows into the new company is the undepreciated
capital cost of the depreciable properties owned by the predecessor
companies. In this case, the predecessor companies had on their books
depreciable properties that had an original capital cost of about $50
million. Over the years they had claimed as an expense over $30 million
of capital cost allowances in respect of this property, and therefore the
undepreciated capital cost of the property was about $20 million. Under
section 87 the new amalgamated company would be deemed to have
acquired this property at an undepreciated capital cost of $20 million and
would have been required to continue depreciating it from this value.
However, the tax planners came up with a scheme they thought would
allow Envision to acquire this property at its original capital cost, $50
million. Thus Envision would be able to claim as an expense over future
years the same $30 million capital cost allowance for the same properties
that the predecessor companies had claimed.
The tax planning scheme depended upon two assumptions. First, that
the taxpayer could arrange the amalgamation so that it did not fall within
section 87. The strategy for attempting this was somewhat metaphysical.
One of the conditions for section 87 to apply is that “all of the property
… of the predecessor corporations immediately before the merger
becomes property of the new corporation by virtue of the merger”.80 In
an attempt to ensure that this condition was not satisfied, one term of the
amalgamation agreement provided that at the precise moment of their
amalgamation to form Envision the predecessor companies would
transfer the beneficial interest in certain of their real estate properties to a
newly created subsidiary corporation in exchange for shares of that
corporation. Thus, although Envision would acquire the shares of this
corporation, it could be argued that Envision had not acquired all of the
property of the predecessor corporations “immediately before
the merger” since the beneficial interest in the real estate properties that
the predecessor corporations owned immediately before the amalgamation did not become property of Envision. Note that for this argument to
prevail — and this is the metaphysics of it — the transfer of the
beneficial interest to the subsidiary corporation and the amalgamation

carrying forward substantial preferred rate amounts. This would allow it extended access to a
preferential rate of tax available only to credit unions. If Envision was successful in its argument
relating to the capital cost allowances it was assumed that it would also be successful on this point.
80
Income Tax Act, supra, note 2, s. 87(1)(a).
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would have to occur simultaneously. If the beneficial interest in the
properties was transferred an instant before the amalgamation (and thus
the predecessor corporations were holding the shares of the subsidiary
corporation at the time of the merger) or an instant afterwards, then all of
the property of the predecessors would have become the property of
Envision upon the amalgamation and section 87 clearly would have
applied.
The second assumption that the plan depended upon was that if
section 87 did not apply to the merger then the new corporation would
take over the depreciable properties of the predecessor corporations at
their capital costs, namely, $50 million, and not their undepreciated
capital costs, namely, $20 million; that is, that none of the capital cost
allowance claimed by the predecessor corporations would flow through
to Envision (as would be required by section 87). Somewhat surprisingly,
it is not entirely clear how an amalgamation that does not meet the
requirements of section 87 is taxed. The Act itself does not contain any
specific provisions that would apply to an amalgamation that does not
qualify under section 87. Under Canadian corporate law generally the
theory is that upon an amalgamation of two or more corporations the
amalgamated corporation is not a new corporation but is rather a
continuation of the predecessor corporations. All the legal rights and
obligations of the predecessor corporations become rights and obligations of the new amalgamated corporation. By reference to this corporate
law doctrine, some tax commentators have expressed the view that even
if section 87 does not apply, all of the tax attributes and accounts of
predecessor corporations should flow through to a new amalgamated
corporation. Others have suggested that since section 87 provides for a
flow-through of tax attributes upon a qualifying amalgamation, if section
87 does not apply the tax attributes of the predecessor corporations
should not flow through to the new corporation, or else section 87 would
be redundant. Obviously, in support of this second assumption, Envision
was relying upon this latter theory.
On the basis that both of these assumptions were correct, for its
taxation years 2001 to 2004 Envision claimed capital cost allowance
based on an opening balance of undepreciated capital cost of $50 million
(the combined capital cost of the depreciable assets of the predecessor
corporations). The Minister reassessed on the basis that Envision was
only entitled to claim capital cost allowances on an opening balance of
$20 million (the capital cost of $50 million minus the capital cost
allowances claimed by the predecessor corporations).
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The Minister asserted two alternative bases for reassessment
(basically contradicting each of the taxpayer’s planning assumptions):
first, section 87 applied to the transaction and therefore the undepreciated
capital costs of the assets of the classes of depreciable property of the
predecessors flowed through to the taxpayer and, second, even if section
87 did not apply, those tax attributes still flowed through based upon the
corporate law continuation theory of amalgamations.
The Minister also argued that if she lost on both of those points, the
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”) should apply. Since all of
the judges held that the Minister was successful on one or the other
of her two alternative bases for reassessment, or both, they did not deal
with the application of the GAAR.
(a) Tax Court of Canada81
In refusing to give credence to the taxpayer’s egregious tax planning,
Webb J. (himself a former tax planner) held that the taxpayer had
successfully dislodged the application of section 87 but that following
general corporate law doctrine the tax attributes of the predecessor
corporations flowed through to Envision in any event.
He held that property is transferred when the parties intend it to pass
and in this case there was ample evidence that the predecessor
corporations intended to transfer their beneficial interest in the real estate
properties to the newly created subsidiary corporation at the very
moment of the amalgamation.82 Thus, these properties, which were
owned by the predecessor corporations immediately before the
amalgamation, did not become Envision’s property by virtue of
the amalgamation, as required by section 87. Section 87 thus did not
apply to flow through the predecessors’ tax attributes, such as the
undepreciated capital cost of their depreciable capital properties, to
Envision.
In arguing that section 87 should apply, the Minister had argued that
when two credit unions amalgamate in British Columbia, the new
amalgamated corporation must by law acquire all of the property of the
predecessor corporations. The Credit Union Incorporation Act (British
Columbia), the Act that governs the amalgamation of credit unions,
81
Envision Credit Union v. Canada, [2010] T.C.J. No. 469, 2010 TCC 576, 2010 D.T.C.
1399 (T.C.C.).
82
Id., at para. 38.
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provides that “[o]n and after the date of amalgamation … the
amalgamated credit union is seized of and holds and possess all
the property rights and interests and is subject to all the debts, liabilities
and obligations of each amalgamating credit union … .”83 Justice Webb,
however, said this provision “simply mean[s] that the amalgamated credit
union would acquire the assets of the predecessor credit unions subject to
any obligations of the predecessors”.84 Thus, the predecessor
corporations were free to transfer property to a subsidiary corporation at
the moment of the amalgamation. Although Envision acquired the shares
of the subsidiary corporation, it did not “directly acquire” the
predecessor’s beneficial interest in the assets transferred to that
corporation.85
Although Webb J. agreed with the taxpayer that section 87 did not
apply to the merger, he went on to hold that the taxpayer could not step
up the cost of the depreciable properties to their original cost of $50
million since the same tax result that section 87 dictated, namely, that the
tax attributes of the predecessors flowed through to the taxpayer, was
achieved by application of the well-known corporate law principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Black and Decker.86 In that case the
Supreme Court held that if the relevant corporate statute specifies that
the amalgamated corporation is a continuation of the predecessors and
not a new corporation, then the predecessors continue “without
subtraction” in the amalgamated corporation.87 The legislation that
applied to the amalgamating credit unions provided that amalgamating
credit unions “are continued as one” and that “the amalgamated credit
union … possesses all the property, rights and interests” of each
amalgamating credit union. This wording is similar to language in
Canadian corporate law statutes and is identical to that considered by the
Supreme Court in Black and Decker. Therefore, Webb J. concluded that
since in corporate law the two predecessor credit unions continued as one
corporation all tax accounts “flow through” on an amalgamation even if
section 87 does not apply. He stated that “[s]ince the predecessor
companies continue ‘without subtraction’ in the amalgamated company
[this was the language of Dickson J. in Black and Decker] [the
83
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predecessor companies] continued with the depreciation that each such
company had claimed.”88
In reaching his conclusion Webb J. surveyed some of the literature
setting out the competing theories about the tax treatment of
amalgamations that did not qualify under section 87. He also noted the
somewhat inconsistent positions that the CRA has taken over the years.
Finally, he dealt with a series of arguments made by the taxpayer to the
effect that if the tax accounts flowed through on an amalgamation that
was not governed by section 87, then many aspects of that section were
superfluous. Principally, Webb J. noted a number of provisions in section
87 that did not provide for a flow-through treatment such as the provision
deeming the amalgamated corporation to be a new corporation for the
purposes of establishing a new taxation year, rules allowing the adjusted
cost base of some properties to be “bumped”, and rules deeming some
properties to be acquired at their fair market value.
(b) Federal Court of Appeal89
Justice John Evans, writing for the unanimous Federal Court of
Appeal, revealed his hand at the outset of his reasons. He stated that
Envision faced “a daunting challenge” in arguing that “the Act permits
essentially the same people to claim a CCA [“capital cost allowance”] of
$30,876,207 twice over in respect of the same properties”. He went on,
“[i]n my view, only the clearest statutory language could warrant a
conclusion that Parliament intended such an anomaly.”90
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court held for the Minister on both of
the principal grounds she argued: section 87 applied to the case and even
if it did not the tax attributes of the predecessor corporations still flowed
through to the new amalgamated corporation under the continuation
theory of corporate mergers.
The Minister also argued that all amalgamations of taxable Canadian
corporations under corporate law fall within section 87. Justice Evans
found it unnecessary to deal with this argument since on the facts of this
case he held that both conditions of section 87 applied in that “all of the
property … of the predecessor corporations immediately before
88
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the merger [became] … property of the new corporation by virtue of the
merger”. He expressed some incredulity at the taxpayer’s argument that
assumed that “[a]t the same metaphysical moment, the amalgamation
caused the shares and the legal title to the surplus assets [the assets that
had been transferred to the subsidiary] to become property of Envision,
even though, on this theory of the timing of the transaction, the shares
had not been owned by the predecessor corporations immediately before
the amalgamation.”91 In determining that both conditions of section 87
were satisfied he ignored the formalities of the careful tax planning and
looked at the substance of the transaction.
On the question of whether all of the properties of the predecessor
corporations had become the property of the new corporation, Evans J.A.
noted that after the merger Envision owned shares in a subsidiary
corporation that in turn held the beneficial interest in the real estate that
the subsidiaries had transferred to it. Therefore, it could be said that the
property of the predecessors had become property of Envision. Merely
the form of the property had been changed: “[a]ll the property owned by
the predecessor immediately before the amalgamation can … be traced
directly to property owned by Envision after the amalgamation.”92
On the question of whether the predecessors’ property became
property of the new corporation “by virtue of the” amalgamation,
Envision had argued that the shares of the subsidiary corporation became
Envision’s property by virtue of a purchase and sale agreement and
issuance of the shares. Justice Evans bluntly explained that insofar as all
this happened “at the moment of amalgamation” the transactions were
“part of a composite transaction, each component of which was
intimately related to the merger”.93
In addition to holding that section 87 applied to the amalgamation of
the credit unions, Evans J.A. determined that even if section 87 did not
apply to the merger, the predecessor’s tax accounts would flow through
to the amalgamated corporation. The wording of the amalgamating
statute (in which merging credit unions “continue as one”) invoked the
“continuation” model of amalgamation as set out by the Supreme Court
in Black and Decker and under which Envision acquired the tax
attributes of the predecessors, including the undepreciated capital cost of
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their depreciable properties. In supporting this holding, Evans J.A.
closely followed the reasoning of the trial judge.
The taxpayer attempted to foreclose this reasoning by arguing that
section 87 “is an exhaustive codification of the circumstances in which
the tax attributes of amalgamating corporations flow through to the
amalgamating corporation”.94 Thus by negative implication, and
the interpretive presumption against redundancy, the Court should hold
that the flow-through principle does not apply if section 87 does not
apply. Justice Evans rejected this argument by reasoning that even
though section 87 allows for the flow-through of many tax attributes, it is
premised on the “new corporation” model of amalgamation, not the
Black and Decker “continuation” model: “[t]here is thus no basis to
imply a legislative intent that section 87 should occupy the field.”95 For
the same reason, namely, that section 87 and Black and Decker are based
on two different models of amalgamations, “[r]edundancy simply does
not arise here, especially since section 87 pre-dates Black and Decker.”96
(c) Supreme Court of Canada
Like both lower courts, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer’s
tax plan was unsuccessful and dismissed Envision’s appeal. However, the
Court held that the reasons given by both lower courts for this conclusion
were wrong. Justice Rothstein, writing for the Court’s majority, himself
and five of his colleagues, held that the section 87 requirements were
satisfied, and therefore the tax attributes of the predecessor corporations
flowed through to Envision, because of the specific language of the
Credit Union Incorporation Act,97 the Act under which the credit unions
were amalgamated. As a consequence of an amalgamation under the Act,
that Act provides that the amalgamated credit union “is seized of and
holds and possesses all the property” of each predecessor.98 Justice
Rothstein stated that amalgamating credit unions cannot contract out of
this mandatory consequence of an amalgamation. Hence, at the exact
moment of amalgamation, Envision acquired all of the property of the
predecessor corporations, including the real estate property that Envision
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then transferred to the subsidiary corporation pursuant to the purchase
and sale agreements that accompanied the amalgamation agreement.99
Justice Rothstein supported his reading that the amalgamating Act
mandated all of the property of the predecessor corporations to become
property of the amalgamated corporation by reference to the statutory
scheme of the Act and its policy objective of protecting creditors and the
public.
In elaborating on the consequences of his holding, Rothstein J.
acknowledged that given his reading of the British Columbia Credit
Union Incorporation Act, since “effectively all corporate amalgamation
statutes in Canada provide for continuity in respect of assets and
liabilities”,100 this requirement of section 87 should be satisfied in all
statutory amalgamations.
Justice Rothstein made it clear that he disagreed with the reasoning
of Evans J.A. as a way of reaching the same result in this case. Justice
Evans had held that Envision was seized of the property of the
predecessor corporations since it owned the shares of the subsidiary
corporation that in turn owned some of the property of the predecessor
corporations after the amalgamation. Under the heading “Tracing Must
Be Rejected”, Rothstein J. observed that “[i]t is a basic rule of company
law that shareholders do not own the assets of the company” whose
shares they own.101 Envision therefore could not be said to be seized of
the property owned by its subsidiary.
Since he held that section 87 applied in this case, Rothstein J. did not
deal with the question of whether if it did not apply the attributes of the
predecessors would flow through pursuant to corporate law as held in
Black and Decker, and by both of the courts below.
Justice Cromwell wrote a concurring judgment in which although he
agreed with the conclusion of the majority, he strongly objected to the
majority’s interpretation of the relevant provision in the Credit Union
Incorporation Act. He stated that it was “unnecessary and undesirable” to
interpret the section in the way that the majority did and furthermore it
might have unintended consequences.102 He gave a straightforwardsounding reason for holding that section 87 applied. We set it out here in
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his own words since the metaphysics of his point (and indeed of the
whole tax planning arrangement) are a bit of mystery to us:
… at the moment Envision was created, the predecessor corporations
ceased to have any independent legal existence. There was thus no
point in time when … [the predecessor corporations] and Envision
Credit Union existed as separate legal entities such that the …
[predecessor corporations] could convey their property to Envision
because, at the moment of amalgamation, only Envision was a separate
legal entity. This is sufficient to fully answer the appellant’s appeal and
I would stop the analysis there.103

He then went on at some length about why the Court should not rest
the case on an interpretation of the Credit Union Incorporation Act;
however, that was the sum total of his reasoning in holding for the
Minister.
2. Analysis
Justice Rothstein begins his judgment in this case by reminding his
readers, “[e]very taxpayer is entitled to order his or her affairs so that the
tax payable is less than it otherwise would be.”104 This maxim was
famously used in the notorious Duke of Westminster case to justify a
flagrant tax plan and is repeated by every aggressive tax planner at every
opportunity. But one wonders why? The assertion is perfectly true but
perfectly meaningless. Of course taxpayers are entitled to order their
affairs (within the law) to minimize their taxes; no one would dispute
that. The only pertinent question is, have they done it? With respect to
that question the maxim provides no guidance.
Since tax avoidance is an emotion-laden subject, it is interesting to
note the reactions of the judges in this case. Justice Miller in the Tax
Court of Canada was a tax planner (among other careers) before he
joined the bench. Although he held against the taxpayer, he upheld the
contrived scheme to dislodge the effect of section 87. Justice Evans, in
the Federal Court of Appeal, a well-known public law scholar, appeared
puzzled that anyone would take the tax planning scheme seriously. He
had no difficulty finding that Envision was seized of the property of the
predecessors that was transferred to a subsidiary corporation since that
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corporation was wholly owned by Envision. As he noted, the transactions
relating to the merger “merely changed the form of the predecessors’
property”.105 He devoted two short paragraphs to stating and justifying
this finding. He also had no difficulty finding that the predecessor’s
property became property of Envision “by virtue of the merger”: “the
transactions under which Envision became the owner of the shares at
the moment of amalgamation were part of a composite transaction, each
component of which was intimately related to the merger”.106 This
finding took him one paragraph. In the tax literature the importance of
distinguishing between the owners of a corporation and the property of
the corporation is made over and over again. Countless articles have been
written about the fine art of determining when a series of transactions can
be considered as one. Justice Evans alluded to neither of these
difficulties. One suspects that he was aware of them, since he has sat on
many tax cases, but felt that in egregious tax-avoidance cases it is
important to look at the substance of what the parties have done in order
to reach a sensible result. By ignoring widely accepted (but somewhat
contrived) tax doctrine, his judgment presumably greatly unsettled the
tax bar. In the Supreme Court Rothstein J. reverted back to a study of
the metaphysics of the transaction in holding for the Minister. Even
though the taxpayer lost the case, the tax bar was presumably comforted
by the Supreme Court’s judgment.
Also somewhat parenthetically, it is difficult to understand Cromwell
J.’s concurring judgment or why he felt so strongly that the Court should
not decide the case based upon an interpretation of the amalgamating
legislation. He wrote five pages and Rothstein J. three pages dealing
solely with one another’s arguments. We are not familiar enough with the
jurisprudence of either of these judges to speculate on what prompted the
exchange, but anyone who thinks textualism is a good way of resolving
legal disputes should read the exchange. One despairs at knowing who
won the word game. However, here we’ll play the word game, briefly.
Justice Cromwell gave his straightforward reason for holding for the
Minister in the quote we refer to above. We don’t understand his
reasoning, but somewhat oddly at the beginning of the paragraph we
quote above he states that he reached his conclusion “on the basis set out
in para. 50 of my colleague’s reasons”.107 Yet, as we understand the
105
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reasoning of Rothstein J. in para. 50 of his judgment, it depends critically
on his earlier holding that the amalgamating statute mandated that
the amalgamated credit union “is seized of … all the property” of the
amalgamating credit unions.
One has a good deal of sympathy for those who must resolve cases
like this that involve complicated transactions that cut across a number of
tax concepts and staggeringly detailed tax sections. In this case, as in
many of these kinds of cases, the relevant provisions of the Act are rife
with uncertainties. First, it is not clear why section 87 provides for
essentially full rollover treatment for some amalgamations but not others.
That is to say, it is not entirely clear what purpose is served by the
qualifying conditions of section 87. In the tax policy literature, rollovers
for corporate reorganizations are normally justified on the grounds that
even though there has been a change in its form there is continuity in the
taxpayers’ investments and thus most reorganizations do not trigger
sufficient realization to justify treating them as a taxable event. This
rationale clearly underlaid the reorganization rules as they were
originally enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1972.108 However, since then
the rules have been so substantially liberalized that now almost any
corporate reorganization can qualify even though the affected taxpayers
are not continuing with but are disposing of their interests. Indeed, most
of the reorganization provisions are now essentially elective. If the
parties elect in favour of rollover treatment then the affected properties
are deemed to be disposed of at their cost amount and acquired at their
cost amount. If the parties do not elect rollover treatment then all accrued
gains and losses on the properties are recognized. Section 87 does not
provide explicitly for an election for rollover treatment but arguably it
should, and it should be made clear that if an amalgamation does not
come within section 87 then the transaction will be a taxable event for
both the shareholders and the predecessor corporations. The broader
point is that as section 87 is now drafted it is unclear what purpose the
qualifying conditions serve and therefore it is difficult to make sense out
of them.
Second, another level of uncertainty arises in this area since it is
unclear what amalgamating model section 87 rests upon. Is it based upon
a “new corporation” model or a “continuation” (of the predecessor
corporation) model of amalgamation? The answer to this question
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assumed some importance in Envision, since if the section was found to
be based on a new corporation model it allegedly strengthened the
argument that an amalgamation that did not fall within section 87 would
be based on a continuation model. However, aside from being irrelevant
in answering the question of how non-qualifying amalgamations should
be taxed, trying to decide what model of amalgamation section 87 is
based upon is a mug’s game. Over the course of 40 years the section has
been added to, subtracted from, and amended by countless different
drafters, each trying to solve a specific problem in the application of the
section and using different drafting styles. It is futile to imagine that one
can generalize about the theory underlying the section by parsing through
this mess. The leading textbook on corporate reorganization devotes two
pages to lining up the provisions in section 87 from which competing
inferences can be drawn about which model underlies the section.109 Just
incidentally, somewhat oddly, even though the provision is clearly
intended to provide a rollover for qualifying amalgamating corporations,
the section does not provide that the predecessor corporations are
deemed to dispose of their assets at their cost amounts. Did the drafters
assume that in an amalgamation the predecessor corporations continued
in the amalgamated corporation (even though the drafting of the
provision pre-dated Black and Decker) or that such a result could be
inferred from the fact that the section provides that the amalgamating
corporation acquires the assets at their cost amount?
A third level of uncertainty arises over how amalgamations that fall
outside of section 87 are taxed. This of course was an issue that both
lower courts dealt with in this case, but was left unanswered by the
Supreme Court. It is a pity that it did not deal with the issue since it is of
some importance. In deciding against the taxpayer on this issue, both of
the lower courts found that the tax attributes of the predecessor
corporations flowed through to the amalgamated corporation. The main
reason for so holding was that in corporate law, following Black and
Decker, and based on the wording of corporate statutes, the property and
liabilities of predecessors continue into the amalgamated corporation.
But it is not obvious why tax law should follow corporate law in this
respect. In Black and Decker the Supreme Court held that under the
relevant corporate statute the amalgamated corporation was a continuation of the amalgamating corporations and thus the criminal liability of
109
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one of the predecessor corporations became the criminal liability of the
amalgamated corporation. In the context of corporate law, this holding
makes sense since, as the Court noted, otherwise a corporation “by the
simple expedient of amalgamating with another company could free
itself of accountability for acts in contravention of the Criminal Code”.110
However, that consideration is certainly not relevant in terms of tax
principles. A more sensible default position for tax purposes would
appear to be that since there is a substantial change in the nature of the
investment, in an amalgamation there is a disposition at both the
shareholder and corporate level. The argument for this is particularly
strong given that section 87 provides for a rollover for tax purposes for
qualifying amalgamations. Altogether aside from canons of statutory
interpretation, what is the sense of having an income tax that provides
two types of rollovers for amalgamations — one well defined in section
87 and the other completely undefined and that provides no answers to a
raft of the most basic tax questions pertinent to an amalgamation such as
what happens if the two predecessor corporations have different yearends? Moreover, if the corporate concept of continuation were to be
taken seriously, does that mean that the classes of depreciable assets of
the predecessor corporations continue to be depreciated separately? Do
the two corporations continue to file separate tax returns? These and
countless other questions have to be answered if there is going to be a
flow-through of tax attributes on an amalgamation. These questions and
many more are answered in section 87; none are answered if there is
assumed to be a flow-through of tax accounts and attributes outside of
section 87.
Certainly the taxpayer’s position in this case was odd. It argued that
while the predecessor corporations should be treated as having disposed
of their assets at their tax cost amount, the amalgamating corporation
should be treated as having acquired them at their original cost basis. It is
hard to imagine the circumstances under which that would make any
sense. Even aside from sensible tax considerations, how could one justify
adopting one tax attribute from the predecessor corporations, namely, the
cost basis of the assets, but not another, namely, the capital cost
allowances they had claimed?
As we noted above, these and other uncertainties in this area make
resolving unanticipated problems especially difficult and one can only
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sympathize with the problem solver. However, in this particular case we
have no sympathy for the taxpayer or the courts. The position of the
taxpayer was absurd by any standard. The time of the courts should not
have to be taken up with these kinds of cases. It is a testament to the
sorry state of Canadian tax jurisprudence that anyone would think they
had a chance of claiming the same expense twice with such an egregious
tax plan.
Instead of beginning his judgment by noting that “[e]very taxpayer is
entitled to order his or her affairs so that the tax law is less than it
otherwise should be”, Rothstein J. should have begun his judgment by
noting “tax planning … produces nothing of value … . No new
medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed
through tax planning”.111 Indeed, since tax planning imposes costs on
others “it is worse than worthless”.112 He might have continued by
explaining that in interpreting the Act the Court was going to assume that
Parliament is “made up of reasonable people pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably”113 and that if an argument cannot rest upon that
minimal assumption counsel should not waste the time of the Court
making it.

IV. QUÉBEC (AGENCE DU REVENU) V. SERVICES
ENVIRONNEMENTAUX AES INC.: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO
RESTRICT AFTER THE FACT TAX PLANNING
The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to engage with the interesting
and important tax issues before it continues in Québec (Agence du
Revenu) v. Services Environnementaux AES inc. and Québec (Agence du
Revenu) v. Riopel.114 In common law contract law, whether the courts
should intervene to adjust, or rectify, a written contract entered into
between the parties that may not reflect their original intentions is a
complex issue with a long and rich history. Rectification is a restitutionary remedy that allows parties to a valid contract to appeal to the
David A. Weisbach, “Ten Truths About Tax Shelters” (2002) 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, at 222.
Id.
113
Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. (Westbury, NY:
Foundation Press, 1994 (prepared from 1958 tentative ed.)), at 1377.
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equitable jurisdiction of a court in aid of an adjustment to their written
agreement to ensure it conforms to their original intent. Generally
speaking, courts are willing to grant the requested adjustment on the
grounds that the parties reached an understanding but in translating the
understanding to writing, a mistake was made. The challenge in
determining when an adjustment should be permitted is in distinguishing
basic writing mistakes, for example, the failure to add a period to a
number (e.g., $1000.00 becomes $100000) from circumstances where the
oral agreement or understood intentions of the parties may be much
further from the written contract. Rectification might sensibly be
permitted in the former instances, but not in the latter. The key
determination is where the line should be drawn.
In Quebec, the remedy of rectification has a less storied history. The
Civil Code of Québec115 governs matters of private law, to the exclusion
of common law and equity doctrines. Nevertheless, the Civil Code of
Québec includes a provision that enables courts to adjust a contract when
it does not reflect the intention of the parties. In particular, Article 1425
of the Civil Code of Québec provides, “[t]he common intention of the
parties rather than adherence to the literal meaning of the words shall be
sought in interpreting a contract.” In recent years there has been an
ongoing debate in Quebec of whether this provision applies only to allow
for the correction of obvious basic writing mistakes or whether it
incorporates a broader remedy into Quebec civil law analogous to the
remedy of rectification as applied by some common law courts.
The use of rectification as a mechanism for adjusting the underlying
contractual arrangements in tax cases is a relatively new development. In
the common law provinces, taxpayers began relying on rectification in
the mid-1990s, with greater proliferation in the 2000s following the
controversial decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Juliar.116 In
AES, the Supreme Court could have seen itself as tasked with
distinguishing contracts that are appropriately rectified in tax cases from
those that are not. Instead, the Court preoccupied itself only with the
issue of whether the civil law allows a remedy analogous to rectification
without clarifying the precise contours of that remedy and whether it is
the same in Quebec and the common law provinces.
115
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1. Facts
The Supreme Court had two sets of facts before it in AES: the facts
from AES117 and the facts from Riopel.118 The cases, both of which
addressed rectification in the civil law context on tax facts, were joined
before the Supreme Court. In AES, the taxpayer attempted a tax-deferred
reorganization but was mistaken about the cost base of the shares
exchanged. To provide a little more detail, Centre technologique AES
Inc. (“Centre”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Services
envrionnementaux AES Inc. (“AES”). AES decided to sell 25 per cent of
its shares to Centre. To effect the sale, the companies agreed they would
undertake a tax-deferred exchange of shares under section 86 of the
Income Tax Act and sections 541 and 543 of the Quebec Taxation Act.119
AES understood that it had cost of a little over $1.2 million in its shares
of Centre. As a result, it received a promissory note equal to its cost as
part of the reorganization. AES later discovered that its cost was only a
little over $95,000. The CRA reassessed and treated AES as having
realized a capital gain of $840,770, namely, the amount by which the
promissory note it received from Centre exceeded the real cost of its
shares, given the capital gains inclusion rate.
In Riopel, the taxpayer also requested rectification of a contract for
the sale of shares. The taxpayer, Mrs. Archambault, and her husband
wanted to restructure their investments with the objective of extracting
some of the value held in a related company without tax implications.
Their advisors described a plan for transferring shares, merging related
companies, and redeeming the shares, that would have achieved that
objective. Ultimately, however, the couple’s advisors did not undertake
the reorganization in the fashion described. The result was that the
redemption of the taxpayer’s shares was taxable. In an effort to fix
the reorganization error, the advisors modified the restructuring without
consulting Mrs. Archambault and her husband or explaining their
mistake.
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(a) Trial Court
At trial in AES,120 the Agence du revenue du Québec argued that the
Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over the issue, that articles 1400
and 1407 of the Civil Code of Québec prevented an action for
rectification,121 and furthermore that the Code itself did not provide a
remedy analogous to the common law rectification remedy but only
allowed the Court to correct obvious transcription errors, and that the
original documents appropriately reflected the parties’ intent. In a nineparagraph decision, Borenstein J. concluded that the facts of the case
militated in favour of rectification.
In contrast, at trial in Riopel,122 the Quebec Superior Court denied
rectification. Justice Nantel determined that while Mrs. Archambault and
her husband had agreed to a tax-free reorganization of their affairs, the
plan was not implemented as described. As LeBel J. summarizes in his
review of the decision, “[t]he trial judge found, first, that no agreement
of wills that would have led to the formation of a contract had resulted
from the meeting of September 1, 2004 between the parties and their
advisors.”123 Justice Nantel determined that the discrepancy between the
original plan and the plan as executed might justify annulling the contract, and noted that that remedy would undoubtedly create a host of new
tax-related problems. She therefore denied the request for rectification on
the grounds that the error was not clerical in nature, but rather was an
error affecting the substance of the transaction’s structure. In a succinct
judgment, she additionally held that the common law doctrine of
rectification should not be transposed into civil law.
(b) Quebec Court of Appeal
The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed rectification in both AES and
Riopel. The Court in AES,124 in a judgment authored by the Court,
permitted rectification of the contract on the grounds that courts can
correct a discrepancy between the common intention of the parties and
the intention as reflected in the contract, relying on article 1425 of the
120
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Civil Code of Québec, as long as the request is legitimate and third
parties’ rights are not unduly affected. As a result, the Court did not find
the civil law to be a barrier to contractual rectification in these
circumstances.
In a judgment rendered a couple of months after AES, the Quebec
Court of Appeal permitted the appeal in Riopel CA,125 also determining
that article 1425 of the Civil Code of Québec enables rectification.
Following AES, and excerpting extensively from that decision, the Court
of Appeal determined that the error in Riopel was a discrepancy between
the common intention of the parties and the intention reflected in the
contract itself.
(c) Supreme Court of Canada
At the Supreme Court, Revenue Québec, supported by an
intervention by the Attorney General of Canada, argued that the civil law
precluded rectification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,
determining that article 1425 allows for parties to have their written
instruments amended to reflect their original agreement.
The Court did not engage in an extended discussion of the scope of
rectification. The first paragraph of LeBel J.’s decision includes the
conclusion that: “[t]he intention [of the parties] was that their agreements
would have no tax consequences.” On one level, that statement elides the
issue that has been the focus of much of the discussion of rectification,
post-Juliar, namely, what is required to understand the parties’ intent,
and how specific does that intent have to be? The Supreme Court
concludes that “[t]he common intention of the parties was expressed
erroneously in all the writings prepared to carry out the tax plans on
which they had agreed.”126 Justice LeBel proceeds with a caution to
taxpayers that they, “should not view this recognition of the primacy of
the parties’ internal will — or common intention — as an invitation to
engage in bold tax planning on the assumption that it will always be
possible for them to redo their contracts retroactively should that
planning fail.”127 Without a sense, however, of how specific the parties’
intentions must be, and how far the written agreement is permitted to be
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from those intentions, it is hard to imagine how a taxpayer will know
whether or not she is engaged in bold tax planning.
Although the scope of Juliar was expressly raised by the Attorney
General, the Court elected to limit its discussion of that decision on the
grounds that it did not have common law rectification before it for
consideration. However, quixotically, LeBel J. does note that Juliar
appears incompatible with the Supreme Court’s non-tax jurisprudence on
common law rectification.128
2. Analysis
AES presented the Supreme Court with its first chance to look at the
role of rectification in the tax context. However, it restricted its holding
to providing that the civil law allows for a remedy like rectification. It
refused to provide guidance on the pressing issue for tax law: when
should a taxpayer be able to revisit the design of a flawed tax plan?
On the issue of whether the civil law permits rectification, the
Supreme Court’s decision resolves uncertainty born of two lines of lower
court decisions.129 In Brochu v. Placements Donald Brochu inc.,130 for
example, the Quebec Superior Court permitted rectification of an estate
freeze. In Brochu, the taxpayer believed there was roughly $1 million in
the company’s capital dividend account. The company declared a $1 million dividend and elected to pay it out of that account. Ultimately, the
capital dividend account was determined to have closer to $750,000 in it,
and the taxpayer was reassessed and held to owe tax on the excess
distribution. The Court allowed the taxpayer to repay the excess to the
company, ensuring that the distribution of the amounts in the capital
dividend account could be received tax-free. A contrasting line of
decisions, however, held that rectification was not appropriate under civil
law.131
128
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So, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether rectification is
permitted in civil law, although by distinguishing the civil law remedy
from the common law remedy, it left uncertainty about the scope of
rectification in both civil and common law. Additionally, the Supreme
Court left unaddressed the harder question of where the line should be
drawn between rectifiable and non-rectifiable contracts in the tax
context. The uncertainties in the area of when contracts should be
rectified in the tax context have been laboriously documented by tax
practitioners and scholars.132
Much of the uncertainty about rectification in the tax context has
arisen as a result of the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Juliar. In
Juliar, the Ontario Court of Appeal, following the lower court decision,
allowed the taxpayers to adjust their contractual arrangements. The
parties had transferred shares to a corporation in exchange for
promissory notes that equalled the value the parties believed to be their
cost in the shares. If their assumption about the cost of the shares had
been accurate, the transaction would not have attracted tax. In fact, the
promissory note was worth more than the cost of the shares, and the
taxpayer was reassessed as having received a taxable deemed dividend.
The taxpayers could have undertaken the transaction differently, by
transferring their shares in exchange for shares: a transaction that would
have been tax-deferred. The trial judge found the evidence that the
parties wished the transaction to be undertaken in a way that deferred tax
clear and convincing. The Ontario Court of Appeal, affirming the lower
court decision, held that the contract could be rectified. The Revenue
Agency expressed concern about the approach taken in Juliar and
released a notice confirming that they would oppose applications for
rectification that asked the Court to undo an intended transaction and put
in place a new one formed after the original transaction.133
Since Juliar, courts have grappled with the appropriate boundaries
on the equitable remedy of rectification and the instances where
132
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taxpayers have requested rectification from the courts have
proliferated.134 In some decisions an expansive approach to rectification
has been followed. For example, in Snow White,135 the taxpayer entered
into a production services agreement with the object of qualifying for the
film production tax credit. Ultimately, the contract referred to a party as
the copyright owner, when it turned out that person did not own the
copyright. The credit was denied by the CRA. The parties sought to
rectify the agreement by substituting the name of the party to the contract
without the copyright ownership to the name of the person who in fact
held copyright. The British Columbia Supreme Court permitted the
rectification, even though, as Joel Nitikman suggests, “[i]t could hardly
be said that the new party had had a continuing common intention to be a
party to the contract, or else it would surely have been a party.”136
Another line of cases courts have read Juliar more restrictively. For
example, in a thoughtful recent decision Graymar Equipment (2008) Inc.
v. Canada (Attorney General),137 authored by Brown J. of the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench (now Brown J.A. of the Alberta Court of
Appeal), a former faculty member at the University of Alberta, that was
rendered after AES, the Court denied a rectification request on the
grounds that the taxpayer did not prove a tax minimization objective. The
taxpayer (a partnership) in Graymar inadvertently left a shareholder loan
outstanding with the result that the partners of the partnership were
required to include a portion of the outstanding loan in their income. The
taxpayer sought to backdate a resolution that would settle the loan
retroactively. The Court in Graymar rejected the argument that tax
minimization is an element of every transaction and therefore must have
been an intention of the parties in the loan transactions. Instead, Brown J.
carefully circumscribed the scope of Juliar, distinguishing between
asking the question “what did the parties originally intend to do?” from
the question “what would they have done had they known about this
unanticipated tax outcome?”138 We are heartened by Brown J.’s thorough
134
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review of the case law and underlying principles, alongside his tendency
to consider the consequences of his decision, “[t]o hold otherwise — that
is, to skate over the requirement, as Juliar does, of showing the intention
underlying the original transaction — would effectively render the CRA
(and, by extension, Canadian taxpayers) the insurer of tax advice
providers. This is undesirable.”139
The Supreme Court had an opportunity, given these conflicting lines
of cases, to resolve the issues they raise, including whether tax cases
should be treated differently than other rectification requests and how the
scope of cases where rectification is requested should be limited. Courts
have, at least in some instances, expressly distinguished the rectification
cases with tax subjects from those with non-tax subjects. For example, as
Masuhara J. states in Fraser Valley,140 “[i]n tax cases rectification is
granted to rectify documents that are inconsistent with the expressed and
agreed intent of the parties to a contract. Intent is relevant, because where
intent is common and continuing it forms a part of the true agreement
between the parties to a contract.”141 Similarly, and perhaps even more
obviously, Campbell J. in Di Battista states, “once the Court is satisfied
that the true agreement between the parties (which is based on the
transaction not attracting or at least minimizing income tax) is frustrated”
rectification can be granted.142
As a general matter, our view is that there is no need for judges’
approach to rectification to be the same in tax cases and in non-tax cases.
One of the responsibilities of judges in resolving tax cases is to
characterize the transaction. The purpose of that characterization exercise
is, most fundamentally, to adjudicate whether or not the taxpayer has
income, appropriately subject to tax. This requires examining the
economic substance and effect of the transactions undertaken by the
taxpayer. This purpose is presumably different from the exercise of construing contracts in other settings, where the fundamental point of
construing the contract is not to make sense of whether or not the
taxpayer has income. When the fundamental purposes of interpreting a
contract for tax purposes are accepted, the discord between the tax
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rectification cases and the “other” rectification cases in and of itself is
not troubling.
The troubling aspect of the tax rectification cases is the
unwillingness of the judges in cases from Juliar forward to articulate an
appropriate approach to distinguishing cases that merit rectification from
those that do not. Drawing such a line is, given the absence of a
principled ground for distinction, a necessarily pragmatic task. That
exercise should take as its foundation the purpose for distinguishing
between rectifiable and non-rectifiable cases the purpose of the income
tax legislation: to tax income. In cases where the taxpayer has received
economic income as a result of the arrangements undertaken, the
agreement should not be rectified even if the parties had initially hoped
for more favourable tax treatment. The taxpayer has received income and
the income tax legislation is appropriately being applied to tax it. This
approach ensures the appropriate result: that taxpayers are taxed when
they have income and they are not taxed when they do not.
Enabling rectification in only the narrow cases where the agreement
does not reflect the intention of the parties and might have as a
consequence taxation for the taxpayer where no economic income was
received (for example, where the taxpayer was paid $1000.00 but the
agreement mistakenly said $100000) has the additional benefit of
preserving public resources. Assessing taxpayers and bringing cases
through the superior courts is expensive and unproductive. Where
possible, and especially where the taxpayer has received economic
income, it makes sense to design tax rules in a way that minimizes court
time. The broader scope for rectification, which enables a taxpayer to
bring a claim for rectification where the parties hoped for a different tax
result (generally tax deferral or non-taxation), creates an incentive for
taxpayers to bring costly claims through the court system where the
hardship for the taxpayer (given that they have economic income) is not
obvious. In cases like AES and Riopel it leaves the public as the insurer
of bad accounting and legal advice.
The Supreme Court had the ideal cases in front of them to clarify the
appropriate approach to rectification in tax cases. It also had an
opportunity to clarify the relationship between the civil and common law
approaches to rectification. Instead of resolving these issues, the Court
left them for another day. Too bad. Undoubtedly, given the incentives the
continued uncertainty about the scope of rectification creates for
taxpayers to seek after-the-fact adjustments to their tax plans, the
Supreme Court will be revisiting this issue again in the future.

